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Abstract
Why are companies increasingly adopting the language of ‘citizenship’ to describe 
themselves? This is the issue taken up in this article. It is suggested the claims and forms 
of address in respect to ‘global corporate citizenship’ are part of wider governance 
moves in the international system, associated with a certain constitutional terminology 
and moves to progressively juridicalize the international arena. The article explores 
the forms of these moves as regards company activity in particular, and illustrates 
the diffi cult consequences of the processes being described from the point of view 
traditional international law and corporate governance.
1. Introduction
For several years I have been interested in the idea of ‘corporate citizen-
ship’ (Thompson 2005, 2006, 2008a, 2008c). Why are companies ei-
ther adopting the terminology of corporate citizenship to describe them-
selves as, or being addressed through the language of, corporate citizen-
ship? Many MNCs are overtly claiming to be ‘good global corporate 
citizens’ as they expand their activities and put corporate social respon-
sibility commitments at the centre of those business activities. The UNs 
Global Compact explicitly addresses its signatories as ‘citizens’ and the 
World Economic Forum has a long standing programme of corporate 
citizenship (Schwab 2008; WEF 2008). What is more, countries are 
also adopting this language to describe themselves, e.g. the Australian 
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Prime Minister’s recent claim that the country’s foreign policy would 
be guided by the principle of ‘good global citizenship’ (Rudd 2007).
These claims and forms of address are, I suggest, connected to a larg-
er set of governance moves in the international system which will be 
outlined in a moment. In part this is a response to the widely perceived 
undermining of the traditional system of nation-based governance as 
global and transnational forces are argued to have swept aside the pos-
sibility of continued sovereign state interactions forming the core of 
‘global governance’ (e.g. in the form of multilateralism or inter-gov-
ernmentalism). Rather, in this ‘post-Westphalian world’ a new cosmo-
politan order is in the process of being constructed where the axis of 
identity and politics will be decidedly ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ the nation 
state. Never mind the actual reality of ‘globalization’ being far from the 
mythical versions of its characterizations (Hirst et al. 2009), the idea of 
globalization is so fi rmly entrenched that it has become the taken for 
granted commonsense of the current international system by almost all 
academics, politicians and political commentators alike. This itself is 
both intriguing and worrying. Quite why this terminology has become 
so effective and ubiquitous in its embrace when any serious examina-
tion of the evidence about its claims shows these to be at best ambigu-
ous but more often simply wrong, is a complex issue and something 
that cannot be addressed here. But the strong perception of globaliza-
tion persists nonetheless.
But before proceeding we need to draw an important analytical dis-
tinction between an inter-national economic structure (note the hyphen 
– not an ‘international’ one) on the one hand and a global economic 
structure on the other (Hirst et al. 2009: chapter 1). An inter-national 
economy is an economy made up of a series of individual national econ-
omies that interact between themselves mainly via activities like trade 
interdependency, investment integration and migration (trade, invest-
ment and labour fl ows across borders). The most signifi cant feature of 
this – though not the only one – would still be these separated national 
economies that interact between themselves.
 On the other hand a global economy would be an economy that ex-
isted as a single economy in its own right somewhat beyond the inter-
acting individual national economies. This economy would be driven 
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by market forces and competition between ‘footloose’ economic agent 
(companies, banks, fi nancial institutions, individuals) that are not clear-
ly tethered to any single national economy but which would take the 
global arena as their sphere of operations: producing, sourcing, market-
ing etc., and moving their operations across the globe according to the 
profi table opportunities that present themselves anywhere. These two 
types of economy are ‘ideal types’ – a kind of conceptual model – that 
do not exist as such in practice or on the ground, so to speak. They pro-
vide an abstract image of two different possible types of economy and 
when referring to the idea of a global system in the analysis that fol-
lows I am explicitly invoking the second type of economic structure 
just outlined.
However, in this article, far from engaging in yet another round of 
utopian calls for a new global covenant, global democracy or wishful 
thinking about a new enlightened cosmopolitanism as the responses to 
these supposed forces of globalization, I examine the actual practices of 
governance that are immanent and already embodied in the nature of the 
‘international disorder’ that typifi es this fi eld. To do this I fi rst set up the 
idea of global corporate citizenship to ask why companies might be pre-
pared to adopt this terminology since it has many dangers attached to it 
for them (as well as potential benefi ts, of course). I then go on to argue 
that there is a connection between the adoption of the language of ‘citi-
zenship’ and that of ‘constitutionalism’ and suggest that there is a shad-
owy ‘quasi-constitutionalization’ of the international system underway 
for which the terminology of global (corporate) citizenship is an impor-
tant part (Joerges et al. 2004; Schepel 2005). In turn, this connects to 
various senses of the juridicalization of international affairs, where new 
or revitalized types of law are increasingly being brought into play as 
the mechanisms for resolving disputes or organizing governance. Vari-
ous claims as to the nature of the constitutionalization process are then 
investigate, one of which I try to mine for an appropriate terminological 
resource to discuss the legitimization of the emerging international sys-
tem as I see it. Finally, I sum up on the troubled nature of these delibera-
tions, since my argument is that this leaves us with several unpalatable 
implications and dilemmas that will not be easy to resolve.
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2. Corporations and Citizenship
Why might companies adopt the language of citizenship to describe 
themselves? In this section I concentrate on why many companies are 
adopting this terminology.
The main point is that it reveals a basic vulnerability that companies 
perceive in terms of their general business position. Companies – even 
the very largest companies – feel increasingly threatened by develop-
ments in the international fi nancial system in particular and in respect 
to their business environment in general. Companies have always been 
subject to the normal dictates of stock market discipline, involving the 
market for corporate control or the possibility that new and innovative 
competitors will arise with an invention that can quickly undermine 
even the most carefully crafted business model. But new ubiquitous 
threats are arising, this time from hedge funds, private equity funds 
and sovereign wealth funds. These have had such extensive resources 
available that they can stalk and takeover even the largest of compa-
nies. Often these funds are allied with ‘activist shareholders’, so target-
ed companies can now be subject to a level of harassment that they fi nd 
diffi cult to combat or resist. In the wake of the 2007/08 credit crunch – 
when liquidity from the investment banking system dried up – private 
equity has begun to tap into the resources offered by sovereign wealth 
funds as a way of by-passing the (remaining) banks of Wall Street and 
the City of London.
What private equity does is to take companies out of public fl oata-
tion, ‘restructure’ them to extract ‘shareholder value’ and then to re-
fl oat them once they are supposedly ‘slimmer and fi tter’. Thus effec-
tively private equity ‘privatizes’ the public limited liability company, at 
least for a time, so that it is subject to neither the minimal transparency 
requirements and supervisory oversight of stock exchanges, nor the op-
eration of internal corporate governance. If this mechanisms were to 
expand after the 2007/08 credit crisis subsides (which it is likely to do) 
it could herald the demise of the robust public company in the Anglo-
American economies were it is most active (but beware other econo-
mies, where this mechanism is also likely to take hold). It could leave 
only a rump of out-of-favour or terminally weak companies fl oated on 
stock exchanges, and hollowed out companies that are re-fl oated in the 
wake of their private equity experience.
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A second source of vulnerability for companies is rather of their own 
making, however. This arises from the elaborate and extended supply 
chains they have constructed as part of the internationalization of their 
production process. Such supply chains become progressively diffi cult 
to manage as their scope expands. In particular two type of vulnerabil-
ity arise. First in respect to the sheer physical diffi culty and complexity 
of supply-chain organization as suppliers are more and more remotely 
located and differentiated into sub-subcontracting, and so on. But sec-
ondly – and as a direct consequence of this increased differentiation – 
they are vulnerable from the socially irresponsible activities and condi-
tions often found in their suppliers in these remote locations. NGOs and 
others positively relish drawing public attention to these ‘socially irre-
sponsible’ practices that have somehow escaped the notice of the main 
branded contractor in the metropolitan countries.
So what are vulnerable companies doing in the light of these devel-
opments? They are re-branding themselves ‘corporate citizens’. How-
ever tentatively, cautiously and hesitantly at times, as a response to these 
pervasive threats leading companies are trying to shore up their position 
politically by claiming to be ‘corporate citizens’ and ‘corporately so-
cially responsible’ in one way or another. And this is a defi nite political 
tactic on their part, if also a potentially dangerous one from their point 
of view. Corporate citizenship represents a claim by companies for rec-
ognition that they too have rights, that they perform civic duties, that 
they are public spirited, that they are ethical agents in one way or anoth-
er, and so they should be treated like every other citizen and be subject 
to the same protections. But of course, if companies claim a deserving 
citizenship in this way, they also open themselves up for a different – 
and possibly intrusive – kind of scrutiny. They must be accountable and 
transparent to a wider audience, and above all they must be responsible 
agents (Thompson 2008b).
Of course this idea of citizenship also goes along with a new found 
fondness of these companies not only to both care for the environment 
and act in a socially responsible manner, but also to become an active 
‘partner’ with governments and NGOs in meeting the UNs Millennium 
Development Goals (WEF 2008) or engaging in other civic activities 
that have nothing directly to do with the own business activities. The 
language of MDGs has invaded this area, with companies seemingly 
willing to take on more and more of the tasks associated with these 
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goals. But this could tend to overwhelm them of course, and undermine 
any longer-term commitment to more limited CSR objectives. 
Additionally, there are the marketing opportunities associated with 
being socially responsible and an active corporate citizen. This is part 
of the re-branding of the leading companies, who argue that to integrate 
citizenly activities within their core business operations – and not to see 
it just as an ‘add-on’ – is a way to ensure customer loyalty as and when 
things get tough with the purely fi nancial bottom line.
So what we have is a package of reasons why companies might want 
to adopt a citizenship language. But I would stress the political nature 
of this on the part of companies. It is part of their response to a feeling 
that they should become more overtly ‘political animals’ in a transpar-
ent manner, so as to be able to try to publicly shore up their positions 
(Crane et al. 2008). Of course, companies have always played a very 
active political role – they are adept at lobbying and contributing to po-
litical causes – but this has tended to be done, at the international level 
at least, ‘behind the scenes’ as it were. For instance, companies learned 
a lot from the various WTO negotiating rounds: they felt frustrated by 
the fact that they could not lobby overtly in these arenas, but have had 
to do so via their governments, and this frustration has increased as 
the Doha Round ground to a halt with governments seeming unable to 
reach agreements. A citizenly language – justifi ed in terms of public 
mindedness and civic virtue – provides a potential way out of this di-
lemma for companies. 
Table 1 shows what companies can at present claim and not claim 
in respect to citizenship rights that are analogous to those rights af-
forded to ‘natural persons’ (in the USA in this case – but this is largely 
paralleled elsewhere). Companies are collective agents (sometimes ex-
pressed as ‘artifi cial’ or ‘virtual’ persons), so there is a debate about the 
appropriateness in the use of the terminology of citizenship analogous-
ly between so called ‘natural persons’ (who are far from ‘natural’ of 
course – these are legal categories) and ‘corporate persons’, but I leave 
this aside here (see Thompson 2008a and 2009d).
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They can claim the following:
equality of protection and treatment a) 
trial by jury b) 
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures (e.g. of c) 
property)
no takings without compensation d) 
the exercise of due process e) 
non-discrimination. f) 
They cannot claim the following:
protection against self-incrimination (i.e. the prevention of a witness a) 
from testifying against him-self or her-self) 
that corporations and their offi cers are the same ‘persons’ (thus b) 
corporations are separate from their offi cers – whereas there is no 
analogously similar claim that can be made by ‘natural person’)
claim certain protections whilst abroadc) 
they cannot command a vote, or exercise any of the political d) 
consequences that follow from this capacity.
Table 1. Corporations Claims on Formal ‘Legal Citizenship’ (USA)
Source: Compiled from Aligada (2006)
The features illustrated in Table 1 pertain to a particular country: they 
are written into US constitutional practice or are a consequence of 
judgements made in the courts there – and are similarly enacted in other 
countries. So the protections they offer relate formally to that jurisdic-
tion only. An obvious question is whether they can be extended into the 
international arena, so that citizenship rights for companies along these 
lines might also be afforded to MNCs. Clearly, extending these kinds 
of features – and formal citizenship into this arena – is doubly diffi cult: 
there is no obvious polity to which companies can be held accountable 
or that could legitimize their ‘citizenship’. Jurisdictions, in the main, 
still remain tethered to defi nite territories (there are some extra-territo-
rial jurisdictional competences claimed and exercised by some coun-
tries – the case of the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) in the USA comes 
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to mind – but not in respect of formal company law). However, compa-
nies are claiming citizenship in the manner discussed above neverthe-
less. And they are organizing this along the lines illustrate by the fea-
tures in Table 2.
1: ‘Acts’ Citizenship
Act in a way that invokes a civic virtuea) 




Represents a ‘claim’ onlye) 
2: ‘Status’ Citizenship
Rights and obligations determined within the context of a defi nite a) 
polity
These embodied in a clear legal formb) 
Involves the democratic exercise of membership duties and c) 
obligations
Obligations thrust upon citizens in a ‘take it all’ manner.d) 
Table 2. Characteristics of Two Types of Citizenship
This table divides citizenship into two basic types: ‘acts’ and ‘status’. 
This is not altogether satisfactory since clearly they are both aspects of 
a single category – the real issue is the relationship between these two 
sets of elements. But it is useful to retain the distinction for analytical 
purposes. 
Companies that claim citizenship do so largely on the basis of their 
‘acts’. Their public mindedness is driven by the ‘softer’ elements in-
cluded under the acts heading. Clearly, in an international context in 
particular, the ‘harder’ elements included under the heading of status 
citizenship cannot be fully realized, for the reasons just outlined. But 
perhaps what the earlier discussion of company citizenship demon-
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strates is that companies are beginning to think about claiming several 
of the aspects included under the status heading? They certainly want 
a clear status recognition to be associated with their citizenship. And 
they may be gradually accumulating these as the law imparts various 
constraints on, and opportunities for, companies to demonstrate their 
citizenship credentials in an informal manner through the gradual legal 
codifi cation of CSR initiatives (McBarnet 2007; Zerk 2006).
3. International Juridicalization and Constitutionalization
The rest of this article develops this point by situating global corporate 
citizenship within a wider set of suggestions about what is going on 
in the international arena in respect to its jurdicalization and constitu-
tionalization. The motive for this discussion is the way citizenship, the 
law and constitutionalism have traditionally been closely linked togeth-
er, both in political theory and in jurisprudential analysis and practice. 
There are two main elements to this discussion. The fi rst is to draw at-
tention to the emergence of new forms of legal scrutiny and adjudication 
in the international arena, especially those associated with commercial 
activity. Here the argument will be that we see not only an increase in 
the pertinence of international law proper, but also – and perhaps more 
importantly – of private law, of customary law and of regulatory and 
administrative law (Thompson 2008c). A lot of this is well known and 
not all of these forms of law can be dealt with in the detail they deserve. 
I concentrate on the most pertinent aspects for the purposes of outlining 
why companies might be choosing to adopt the language of citizenship 
in this context. The second main aspect is to develop an argument about 
what is termed here the ‘quasi-constitutionalization’ of the international 
arena. I begin by outlining this aspect but both of these – juridicaliza-
tion (the subjecting of an increasing range of matters governmental to 
legal forms of scrutiny and adjudication) and constitutionalization (in-
volving a distribution of powers) – are closely linked.
Constitutions are relatively modern instruments of rule, and are 
closely associated with the formation of national states from the 18th 
Century onwards. But there has been a proliferation of these as writ-
ten documents since the Second Word War as decolonization gathered 
pace. Traditionally constitutions do two basic things: they allocate pow-
ers and they determine rights and responsibilities. One of the issues as-
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sociated with the writing of constitutions is where exactly to place these 
two aspects. The fi rst aspect has to do with ‘order’ broadly speaking: it 
constitutes the institutions of the state and governance and their respec-
tive powers and relationships, distributing powers between these and 
– very importantly – limiting them in various ways. The second aspect 
has to do with the establishment of the civil rights, obligations and re-
sponsibilities of the parties to the constitution, not just of citizens but 
also of the other institutions of state. Broadly speaking the evolution 
of constitution making has seen the move of the issues associated with 
‘order/powers’ from the front of these documents, with the question of 
‘rights/obligations’ being tucked away at the back, to the reverse; rights 
and responsibilities now occupy the bulk of the documents at the front 
while questions of institutions and powers appear at the back (a clas-
sic example of this can be seen in the case of the 1871, 1919 and 1949 
German Constitutional documents). Most modern, post Second World 
War, constitutions now follow this latter pattern (Dodd 1909; Blaustein/
Flanz 1971 onwards).
As a slight aside here, this is not unconnected to the way Liberalism 
has itself been recast over this period. The original issue for Liberalism 
in the wake of the 17th Century European religious wars was one of es-
tablishing a certain ‘liberal order’(both domestically and international-
ly), from which it was expected rights, justices and fairness would fol-
low. Modern – particularly post Rawlsian – Liberalism reverses this di-
rection of expectations: justices, fairnesses and rights come fi rst, which 
will in turn secure the order necessary for social cohesion. And this pat-
tern of expectations is mirrored in a whole host of other institutional 
contexts that deal with social governance: witness the UN system as a 
conspicuous example – human rights are paramount.
My argument is that companies are tapping into this trend. They want 
to have their rights and obligations more clearly articulate and formally 
recognized like everyone else. They want recognition for the civic du-
ties and social obligations being thrust upon them or for which they are 
taking responsibility. They want to become more openly political, to 
operate more transparently as public actors and be recognized as such. 
They are tentatively moving in this direction, quietly exploring the im-
plications of claims to the capacity of citizenship that these moves en-
tail, but at the same time opening themselves to a different type of scru-
tiny. Thus along with these claims for ‘rights’ goes concomitant calls 
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for increased ‘obligations’ as well; to become more transparent and ac-
countable, something companies are perhaps less comfortable with but 
which they are having to cope with nevertheless.
In addition, I would stress three further issues that might be behind 
these moves which are part of several larger trends going on in the in-
ternational system.
The fi rst of these is the growth of private forms of self-regulation and 
governance. This is part of what has been termed elsewhere the ‘second 
phase of globalization’ (Hirst et al. 2009): a move from the emphasis on 
the fl ows of resources over space, territories and borders to the setting 
of global standards that do not involve fl ows of resources over space to 
secure ‘global integration’. This second phase has seen the prolifera-
tion of such standard setting activity associated with a huge range of 
commercial activities. It involves sometimes the delegation, sometimes 
the devolution but often the simple seizure of the capacity to set these 
standards by quasi-private or totally private bodies. These now both 
claim and exercise the public powers associated with the governance of 
activities involved with these maters.
A second trend is the one alluded to above: the growth of juridicali-
zation of international matters involving legal forms of deliberation, 
adjudication and judgement. This is something that does no just affect 
commercial activity of course. A growing number of areas are affected 
by a similar trend: human rights, environmental protection, confl ict and 
wars. All of these are increasingly being subject to legal forms of inter-
national regulation and governance. Indeed, this looks to be a ubiqui-
tous trend, and an un-stoppable one (Campbell et al. 2001).
Finally, of course there is the surrogate process of constitutionali-
zation; itself not a coherent ‘programme’ or set of rounded outcomes 
but full of contradictory half-fi nished currents and projects: an ‘assem-
blage’ of many disparate advances and often directionless probings. But 
a process nonetheless: it is building norms of conduct, rule making, and 
a distribution of powers in a ‘global polity’ that is itself in the making 
by this very process. Or that is the argument of its proponents.
All this poses many diffi cult and controversial issue which will be 
explored in a moment. And companies are caught up in these wider 
processes: the idea of corporate citizenship and global corporate citi-
zenship fi nds a convenient home amongst these linked processes. In the 
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next section I outline several takes on the idea of transnational constitu-
tionalization or ‘quasi-constitutionalization’ as I prefer to call it.
4. Characterizing the New International Constitutionalism
There are several stands of constitutionalist debate that are outlined 
here. I discuss these in turn, though again they are often overlapping 
and partly fused together.
The fi rst of these is the Neo-liberal stand (Jayasuriya 2001; Gerber 
1994). This very much welcomes the developments discussed so far, 
which it sees as a form of economic constitutionalization without poli-
tics at the international level: the fi nal vindication of the ‘law and eco-
nomics’ school’s long quest for such an outcome at the domestic level. 
From this perspective constitutions are viewed as a decision making 
tool, based upon rational calculation and an organicsist invisible hand. 
The history of the present celebration of this position can be traced 
to the German Order-liberal tradition closely associated with Freiberg 
School theorists such Böhn and Euken in the 1940s, who fought so hard 
to have this position embodied in the German constitution of 1949 (in 
which they were partly successful) (Gerber 1994; Grossekettler 1996; 
Nörr 1996).
A second strand is that typifi ed by Gunter Teubner’s use of a Luh-
mannesque framework of system and subsystem communicative action 
to characterize the constitutionalization of the international sphere (de-
spite their well known differences). Teubner is an inventive and pro-
lifi c writer and exponent of this position, which views the current in-
ternational commercial system as a vindication of the basic intellectual 
architecture of Luhmann’s approach (e.g. Tuebner 1997, 2002, 2004). 
For Teubner these developments are a key indicator of a wider radi-
cal transformation of the international system wrought by the forces of 
‘globalization’. In Teubner’s new world globalization fi nally breaks the 
link connecting the law to democratically constituted political discours-
es and practices. It produces a double fragmentation; cultural polyc-
entrism and functional differentiation. New ‘linkage institutions’ cre-
ate a new law directly by transjurisdictional operations without being 
translated into formal political issues. They escape and evade regulato-
ry claims of both national and international law and practice, and form 
legal sovereignties of their own (for instance a new Lex Mercatoria and 
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Lex Informatica). This global law has no legislation, no political con-
stitution, no politically ordered hierarchy of norms. It is a ‘polycontex-
tual’ law; law with multiple sources displaying no unifying perspective, 
produced by different mutually exclusive discourses of society. Such a 
system of recursive legal operations works in terms of more than one 
code, combining conjunctural and disjunctural operations, connected 
through transjurisdictional operational networks. It displays a heterar-
chical multitude of legal orders rather than a clear and traditional differ-
entiation into legislation and adjudication; a plurality of law production 
comprising a patchwork of ethnic and religious minority laws, rules 
of standardization, variable professional disciplines, contracting, intra- 
and inter-governmental rule making, etc. (Walker 2002). Curbing the 
abuses of power – by the rule of law in the traditional sense – will not 
help in civilizing this many headed hydra. Indeed, we must face the im-
possibility of constitutionalizing this legal multiplicity in the language 
of legal restraint or the arbitrariness of the sovereign. In the fi nal analy-
sis, there is no single sovereign power left.
From a constitutional point of view, however, this imagery is com-
plex and somewhat ambiguous. For Nikolas Luhmann – the spiritual 
father of this position – the social order is made up of a series of (rela-
tively) autonomous spheres of meaning, displaying different ‘logics of 
observation’. These systems may be economic, political, or legal sys-
tems, organizational entities or even individuals. Each of these systems 
orients itself according to its own distinctions, its own constructions of 
reality, and its own observational codes. Here the global system is char-
acterized by overlapping relatively enclosed systems which poses the 
problem of their macro-level coordination and governance. Thus at one 
level, at least, there can be no formal ‘global constitution’. The consti-
tutive differentiation of society into (sub)systems means that they all 
operate according to their own distinctions, thereby continually repro-
ducing new differences as they abut and collide with one another. The 
best that can be expected from this is loose couplings between differ-
ent subsystems (of which the law is a key one). This frustrates any at-
tempt at overall coordination or governance by a competent authority. 
Only ‘self-governance’ is possible driven by the enclosed inner logic of 
each (sub)system. One consequence is that new perturbations, differ-
entiations, irritations, provocations and unexpected events continually 
arise in the world. This enables Tuebner to align it with an understand-
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ing of the global as a radically differentiated ‘polycontextual’ space, 
where territories and national sovereignties are broken apart as contin-
gent events produce a ‘global law without a state’: a transnational legal 
order for global markets that has developed outside of national and in-
ternational law strictly speaking.
What to make of this vision? The problem is that it may be little more 
than an interestingly imaginative fl ight of fancy. Even Teubner recog-
nizes that such law – if it exists in a stable and signifi cant form – is al-
ways judged against and according to existing legal orders. Indeed, the 
strong trend in the contexts that Teubner celebrates is towards the An-
glo-Americanization of such law (Teubner 1997, 2002; Kelemen/Sib-
bitt 2004; Levi- Faur 2005; Applebaum et al. 2001, Part 4; IJGL 2007). 
It is being driven by international legal fi rms and MNCs who all still 
have their own strong national organizational patterns and routines. The 
older and traditional trans-European network of constitutional lawyers 
and arbitration judges, who found and cultivated a specialist niche in 
the ICC and Hague Conference arbitration panels, are being displace 
by new aggressive transnational legal fi rms under Anglo-American and 
German legal dominance. What is more, the empirical evidence sug-
gests that the appeal to such transjurisdictional law in highly limited 
and marginal, and may even be declining, as MNCs and others seek ju-
dicial redress in national courts (Dasser 2001). Applebaum et al. (2001) 
thus conclude: “The lex mercatoria, at least at the present time, seems 
to have far greater signifi cance in the minds of legal scholars and soci-
ologists of law than it does for merchants themselves” (p.18).
A third strand in this debate would be concerned with the political 
legitimation of this emergent constitutional regime (if it exists as such), 
and is associated with a refl ection on a lively debate in the UK about the 
nature of the British Constitution (in the following paragraphs I draw 
liberally on: Loughlin 2005, 2006, 2008a, 2008b; Cane 2005; Law 
1995; Tomkins 2005, amongst many others). This does not start with 
any preconceived ‘model’ of a constitution, or of an emergent order (as 
does Teubner, or the Freiberg School, for instance) but, rather, is based 
upon British pragmatism and an investigation of the immanent practic-
es of the British constitution. Although this might seem a parochial con-
cern, I will argue that it offers a rich language and conceptual resource 
for investigating the international sphere in this regard.
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The debate in the UK is orientated around two different conception of 
the British Constitution (BC): a ‘Republican’ notion that argues there is 
already in place a semi-written and republican constitution based upon 
documents initiated after the Civil War in the 1640s-1670s; and second-
ly a ‘Common Law’ version that maintains the constitution is not a writ-
ten one, but rather a result of a continually evolving set of acts and deci-
sions made in a court led environment. For the purposes of my remarks 
I take the Common Law version. Why? I will argue that the nature of 
the BC is very much like the international quasi-constitutional process 
discussed so far: it is an assemblage of practices rather than a set of fun-
damental laws; it is a political constitution, based upon an evolving po-
litical compromise, rather than a legal constitutional settlement based 
upon a fi rm written document; it involves a combination and coordina-
tion of public and private rule making designed so as to preserve both 
the social autonomy and the public interest; it represents a structural 
coupling between divers and fragmented social discourses. Is this not a 
reasonable description of the international arena as well?
The British debate is most concerned with the nature and role of the 
Rule of Law (RoL) in this context. It is not quite so ready to give up a 
strong notion of the RoL as many are in the context of the so called ‘glo-
bal constitution’ making: here there is a conceding of the RoL, fi rst to a 
notion of the ‘rule by laws’ (not the same thing as RoL); second to the 
rule by lawyers and law fi rms (who are in part making the rules as they 
go along in the international arena – what I would call a new ‘Guild of 
Lawyers’); and thirdly (and perhaps most problematically) to a rule by 
aging law professors who are the ones populating the various institu-
tions of private law making and networks of rule making that is substi-
tuting for the RoL in the international domain (and one I would term a 
new ‘Clerisy of Law Professors’). None of these options appeals to the 
British debate (nor to me!).
Many might suggest that this is all very worthy, but how can these 
sentiments be rendered into principles that ensure legitimacy of this 
British evolving system? Here the ‘Diplock Principles’ are appealed to 
(named after Lord Justice Diplock who laid these out in the 1980s). I 
mention just the four main ones of these: 
Proportionality1. : the idea that actions should be proportion-
al to the offence, harm done, or possible consequences or 
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outcomes. This is also a criteria that is invoked in the case 
of armed confl ict.
Reasonableness2. : the idea that there should be good reasons 
for things, and that the authorities should not act unreason-
ably. This is sometimes termed a ‘rationality’ criteria.
Procedural fairness3. : this idea is most pertinent in the con-
text of administrative and regulatory law. It speaks against 
unfairness on the part of the authorities. But is has nothing 
necessarily to do with participatory farness, though it is of-
ten confused with this.
Due process4. : this is the idea that there is a ‘duty to hear the 
other side’ and thereby allow some disputation.
All these criteria are argued to allow discretionary decision making but 
also to constitute ethical ideals as to the virtuous conducts of the courts, 
policing, statute making and the state’s affairs; they create a pruden-
tial moral force for the control of public affairs. I would like to suggest 
that they could offer an effective set of criteria to be imported into the 
arena of quasi-constitutionalization so as to open up a discussion of the 
legitimacy of that rule making and power distribution system. More on 
this later.
But fi rst there is a fourth strand in this debate, which, whilst it is 
sensitive to the language of constitutionalization in this area and de-
ploys certain of its terminology, I would argue has a basically differ-
ent underlying position. This is to argue that fundamentally we should 
give up on the language of ‘constitutionalization’ and, instead adopt the 
language of ‘governance’ (Cohen and Sable 2006; Zaring 2005). Very 
much drawing on a refl ection from the EU and its governance practices, 
this position stresses the role of multilevel governance, open methods 
of coordination, and the like. Given the well known diffi culty of the EU 
in developing a formal constitution of its own, I think the idea is to give 
up on this altogether and go for a different conceptual language. Con-
stitutionalism is a language of state making in particular, it is therefore 
unsuited for the new ear of globalization. The EU is not a state: at best 
it is a form of ‘confederal public power’, and this should be the model 
for the wider international/global arena.
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One obvious diffi culty with this approach is that the EU is already a 
deeply specifi ed public legal order, but this is not the case with the glo-
bal arena. The RoL already operates effectively in the case of the EU 
so its administrative laws and procedures are subject to this constraint 
and have to operate within this rule. At a more general level much of the 
analysis of global administrative law and the globalization of the RoL 
itself is couched in terms of its compatibility with or complementari-
ty to existing international law (e.g. Dyzenhaus 2005; Salzman 2005; 
Zaring 1998; Zifcak 2005). But this is not the main problem. The issues 
highlighted here is one where there is no competent international public 
law (unlike in the case of the EU): how do we ensure at least some ele-
mentary conformity to the RoL in a system where there is no competent 
authority with the means to enforce whatever quasi-constitutionalized 
‘administrative law’ there may be in the making?
5. Where Does This Leave Us?
Nothing argued above should lead us to feel comfortable about the way 
the international system is evolving in terms of its governance or quasi- 
constitutionalization. The RoL is effectively being given away here and 
there seems little that can be done to stop it. At best some procedural 
principles of democracy are still in play but substantive concerns are 
necessarily on the back foot. In this environment to defend a strong ver-
sion of democracy, citizenship or constitutional practice is diffi cult.
But it might be possible to invoke several criteria of governance to 
provide for some legitimacy in this arena, and here I have argued that 
the ‘Diplock Principles’ of British constitutional practice might serve as 
a language to think about this problem.
For what it is worth my summary of the governance implication of 
this discussion can be found in Figure 1, which I term governance re-
gimes for global legal order because I still remain concerned that there 
is some grounding of the international in a public legal order. 
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Figure 1. Governance Regimes for Global Legal Order
There are two dimensions in play here. Along the horizontal axis are 
‘types of democracy’: ‘popular’ refers to a situation typifi ed by politi-
cal parties and direct engagement, ‘constitutional/republican’ to a more 
procedural emphasis on the division of powers proper and a space for 
various collective ‘civil actors’ to affect outcomes. Along the vertical 
axis are institutional characteristics of politics: the ‘representative’ form 
invokes parliamentarianism, while the ‘governmental’ emphasises the 
role of interest groups and social partners. Within the cells marked out 
by this matrix several forms of legal governmental orders can be found. 
We could all have our particular favourites amongst these. For fairly 
obvious reasons associated with the analysis undertaken above mine 
is the intergovernmentalism/multilateralism option (the poor cousin of 
governance modes in the debate about ‘global governance’), but one 
which at least gives some semblance of feasible democratic control. 
But I would argue collectively they mark out the range of possibilities 
(think of just the EU in respect to this matrix: elements of all four are 
present there I believe).
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I would describe this as an ‘agonal public space’: a space of ‘unity-
in-diversity’ or ‘unity-in-disagreement’. This might make it a durable 
disorder of sorts (rather than a non-durable disorder – a decidedly un-
comfortable prospect). But this hints at the source of my residual dis-
quiet and anxiety for this area.
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